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  1. See the critique of unreflective theories of knowledge of law in Alexander Somek, Rechtliches 
Wissen (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2005), p.7 – associated with the observation “that 
an appropriate theory of law must be formulated as a theory of legal knowledge.”
  2. Thomas Vesting, “Zuhören ist Lesen mit dem Ohr,” in Karl-Heinz Ladeur and Ino Augsberg 
(eds), Talmudische Tradition und moderne Rechtstheorie: Kontexte und Perspektiven einer 
Begegnung (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013), pp. 181ff.; but see also Jacques Derrida, 
“Différance,” in Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago, IL: University 
of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 1ff.
Sociological Aesthetics of Law
Andreas Fischer-Lescano
University of Bremen, Germany
Abstract
Aesthetic theory has the potential to develop a sensorium for the rational and arational forces 
of law. But the aesthetic knowledge of law is underdeveloped. That is why this article proposes 
a self-reflective sociological aesthetics of law that is capable of acknowledging human and social 
forces. The article unfolds its argument in three steps: first, it outlines the main approaches in 
the field of “law and aesthetics”; second, it connects these approaches in legal aesthetics with 
sociological and philosophical discussions on aesthetics; and, third, it suggests what distinctive 
contributions such a connection could make to jurisprudence and legal practice.
Keywords
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The enactment and application of law produce texts by recourse to texts. It is hardly 
surprising, then, that jurisprudence is also mainly thought of as a text-based discipline. 
Law, according to conventional legal theory as “theory of legal knowledge,”1 is linked to 
visual and auditory communication channels: it observes its environment visually, with 
the ear playing at best an ancillary role.2 But as Niklas Luhmann pointed out early on, it 
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  3. Niklas Luhmann, Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990), 
p. 159.
  4. Op. cit., p. 143.
  5. Op. cit., p. 164. See also Gunther Teubner, Constitutional Fragments: Societal 
Constitutionalism and Globalization, trans. Gareth Norbury (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), pp. 62f., who sees in the difference and the coupling of communicative pro-
cesses with consciousness and corporeality the emergence of a form of “social energy” 
that must be captured by social theory. See also Dirk Baecker, Neurosoziologie (Berlin: 
Suhrkamp, 2014), pp. 171ff., on the “tragic relationship” between organism, environment, 
and relational observation.
  6. Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff 
Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).
  7. Max Weber (Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, ed. and trans. 
Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich [Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1978], 
vol. 2, p. 657) argues “that whatever cannot be ‘constructed’ rationally in legal terms is also 
legally irrelevant.”
  8. On the parallel questions in the field of economic aesthetics, see Steven Taylor and Hans 
Hansen, “Finding Form: Looking at the Field of Organizational Aesthetics,” Journal of 
Management Studies 42 (2005), 1211ff.; Samantha Warren and Alf Rehn, “Oppression, 
Art and Aesthetics,” Consumption, Markets & Culture 9 (2006), 81ff.; also Brigitte Biehl-
Missal, Wirtschaftsästhetik (Wiesbaden: Gabler, 2011), and the contributions in Stephen 
Lindstead and Heather Höpfl (eds), The Aesthetics of Organization (London: Sage, 2000).
is a fundamental misconception to think that the reproduction of existing knowledge 
with an increase in novelty is tied to the (visual or auditory) “churning of masses of 
texts.”3 Knowledge is neither text nor image, neither mere words nor empty images. It 
does not represent something objective, but is instead an attitude that finds expression in 
communication. Knowledge is “an expectation stylized as cognitive experience.”4 “Legal 
knowledge,” therefore, is not many things it appears to be: it is not objective, nor is it a 
matter of rationality realized in intersubjective discourses of knowledge. Rather, legal 
knowledge under social conditions of uncertainty is volatile, fragmented, and polycon-
textualized – a result of temporal dislocations and inaccessibilities between communica-
tion and consciousness, between consciousness and the unconscious, and “between 
brains and the outside world, which only acquires form in the brain.”5
Therefore, reflection on legal knowledge cannot build on a meta-rule for legitimizing 
knowledge in a uniform way6 but must be based on a theory of difference: knowledge of 
law arises only in the difference between law and non-law. Thus a theory of legal knowl-
edge takes this basic epistemic difference as its analytical starting point and not the distinc-
tion between rational legal rationality and arational external world.7 The central question 
from the difference-theoretical perspective, therefore, is whether legal rationality makes 
adequate reference back to the non-legal – in other words, whether law, in differentiating 
between law and non-law, develops a sufficiently complex picture of this relationship. The 
resulting requirement to develop a sensorium also for phenomena that are not an expres-
sion of rational, but instead of arational forces aims to develop an aesthetic knowledge of 
law8 that does not drive its concepts and dogmatic systematizations to more and more diz-
zying heights of legal abstraction in self-sufficient isolation from its social contexts but, on 
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  9. Christoph Menke, Recht und Gewalt (Berlin: August, 2011), p. 102.
 10. Bernd Rüthers, “Das Ungerechte an der Gerechtigkeit,” Juristenzeitung (2009), 969ff., 975.
 11. When Foucault observes that “normalizing procedures are increasingly colonizing the procedures 
of law” and hence that “there is a greater and greater need for a kind of arbitrating discourse, for a 
sort of power and knowledge that has been rendered neutral because its scientificity has become 
sacred” (“Society Must be Defended”: Lectures at the Collège de France 1975–1976, trans. 
David Macey, [New York: Picador, 2003], pp. 38–9), he underestimates the drama of polycentric 
colonization through which law is confronted with conflicting processes of normalization.
 12. This is also the basic motif of Hauke Brunkhorst, Critical Theory of Legal Revolutions: 
Evolutionary Perspectives (London: Bloomsbury, 2014).
 13. Luhmann, Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft, p. 160.
 14. Contrary to Weber’s argument in Economy and Society, p. 882: “[T]he formal qualities 
of the law emerge as follows: arising in primitive legal procedure from a combination of 
magically conditioned formalism and irrationality conditioned by revelation, they proceed 
to increasingly specialized juridical and logical rationality and systematization …”
 15. See also Thomas Raiser’s critique of Weber’s concept of rationality: “Hence we must 
acknowledge the facticity of irrational moments and also understand them as a positive 
contribution to individual and social life” (“Max Weber und die Rationalität des Rechts,” 
Juristenzeitung 63 (2008), 853ff., 858).
 16. See already Ernst Cassirer, who insists on the non-dualistic intrication of meaning and the sen-
suous (The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, vol. 3: The Phenomenology of Knowledge [1929], 
trans. Ralph Manheim [New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1957], pp. 281ff.); for a his-
torical reconstruction, see Klaus Holzkamp, Sinnliche Erkenntnis: Historischer Ursprung und 
gesellschaftliche Funktion der Wahrnehmung (Bodenheim: Athenaeum, 1989).
the contrary, is responsive to social and human forces. Law is law only in its difference 
from its non-legal environment in which arational and rational forces alike unfold. Only 
through law’s self-reflection on this difference between law and non-law – this is the thesis 
that I want to develop – can a form of low arise “that knows this about itself.”9
What is called for, therefore, is a “modesty of nescience” that puts an end to the self-
promotion of “those who know the true law.”10 The autonomy of the law is not guaranteed 
by an expertocratic accumulation of knowledge, but only insofar as the law of world 
society opposes to trends toward mercantilist, statist, militarist, of scientific colonizations 
of legal form11 something proper to law itself which upholds the idea of human and social 
emancipation and lends it effectiveness in an alliance with the forces of civil society.12
The prerequisite for this is that legal rationality faces up to the heights and abysses of 
human and social existence, while resisting the temptation to “harness the problem that 
arises here to the distinction between rational and irrational.”13 The rationalization of law 
is not a matter of replacing the “irrationality in the primitive legal procedure” by a purely 
rational legal system.14 On the contrary, legal rationality – that is, law as a social system 
of communication that has become differentiated, like economics, politics, and art – is an 
organized form (also) of arationality.15 Rational and arational – and also, as part of the 
latter, negative anti-rational/irrational – forces are effective in law. We cannot develop a 
complete picture of law by placing a taboo on what lacks rational form, but only through 
reflection on its rational and the arational moments, on its semantic moments and its 
moments of force, on its meaningful and sensuous moments:16 legal knowledge is 
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 17. See also Martti Koskenniemi, “Law’s (Negative) Aesthetic: Will it save us?,” Philosophy 
and Social Criticism 41/10 (2015), 1039ff.
 18. Wolfgang Welsch, “Aestheticization Processes: Phenomena, Distinctions and Prospects,” 
Theory Culture Society 13 (1996), 1–24.
 19. Christian Klein, “Ästhetik des Spiels als Ästhetik des Rechts,” in Andreas von Arnauld (ed.), 
Recht und Spielregeln (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), pp. 273ff., p. 273; see also Heather 
Hughes, “Aesthetics of Commercial Law: Domestic and International Implications,” Louisiana 
Law Review 67 (2007), 689ff., and Katrin van Marle, “Liminal Landscape,” in Katrin van Marle 
and Stewart Motha (eds), Genres of Critique: Law, Aesthetics and Liminality (Stellenbosch: 
Sun Press, 2013), pp. 109ff., p. 112; also, finally, the prognosis by Dieter Simon: “The resist-
ance of lawyers to equating legal art with rhetoric will collapse. They will accept that their 
techniques of argumentation are rhetoric and once again pay homage to form, style, and aes-
thetics” (Recht als Rhetorik – Rhetorik als Recht, Recht im Kontext. Working Paper 5/2012, 
p. 4); see now also the contributions in 1/2015 of the journal Rechtsphilosophie and already 
Anna Schimke, “Tagungsbericht Ästhetik und Recht,” Juristenzeitung (2012), 567f.
 20. Plato, Republic, trans. G.M.A. Grube (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1974) Book III, pp. 68ff., 
pp. 398b–399c, and pp.78ff., pp. 410b–412e.
 21. On paideia, see the classical account in Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, 
Vols. 1–3, trans. Gilbert Highet (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1945).
 22. Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters, trans. M. 
Wilkinson and L.A. Willoughby (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967); see on this already 
knowledge of the law both about its rational and its arational dimensions, consequences, 
and contingencies – and about the tasteless aspects of law, its callousness and its tactless-
ness toward the concerns of social and human emancipation.
The end of such a theory of legal knowledge is a law that is mindful of the dangers of 
infiltration and therefore reflects on both the difference between law and non-law and on 
the interwovenness of rationality and arationality. The means for realizing this end of 
legal theory is aesthetics.17 Aesthetics is the discipline that thematizes relationships and 
contrasts, harmony and correspondence, counterpositions or analogies18 in a way that 
avoids an artificial split between the rational and the arational. Precisely such an approach 
seems to be particularly fruitful when it comes to developing a theory of legal knowl-
edge. To concretize my thesis, I will first outline some of the main approaches in the field 
of “law and aesthetics” (section I). In a second step I will combine these approaches in 
legal aesthetics with sociological and philosophical discussions on aesthetics (section II). 
Finally, in a third step, I will suggest what distinctive contributions such a connection 
could make to jurisprudence and legal practice (section III).
I. Approaches in the Aesthetics of Law
The idea of reflecting on law in aesthetic terms has long since ceased to be “a test of aca-
demic courage.”19 Legal aesthetics can be traced back in the history of ideas to Plato. In the 
Republic, Plato connected the theory of the state with music in the notion of the organiza-
tion of harmony.20 Both in the state as well as in music, he argued, things must be harmoni-
ous in an aesthetic sense. In Friedrich Schiller we also find a combination of aesthetics and 
theory of the state that takes the Greek idea of paideia as its starting point21 and stresses the 
importance of the aesthetic dimension of paideia for the political system.22 Already in the 
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Hermann Blaese, “Schillers Staats- und Rechtsdenken,” in Franz Beyerle and Karl Bader 
(eds), Kunst und Recht. Festgabe für Hans Fehr (Karlsruhe: Müller, 1948), pp. 48ff.; 
from the recent literature, see Klaus Lüderssen, “… daß nicht der Nutzen des Staats 
Euch als Gerechtigkeit erscheine”: Schiller und das Recht (Frankfurt am Main: Insel, 
2005).
 23. Gustav Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie, reprint of 3rd ed. (1932) (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 
1999), pp. 104ff. (106).
 24. For a good overview, see Thilo Tetzlaff, “Der Sound des Rechts. Rechtsästhetik und 
Rechtsakustik,” Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie Beiheft 99 (2004), 85ff.
 25. Heinrich Triepel, Vom Stil des Rechts: Beiträge zu einer Ästhetik des Rechts (1947) (Berlin: 
BWV, 2007).
 26. On the perspective of the “law and literature” movement, see Robert Weisberg, “The 
Law-Literature Enterprise,” Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 1 (1988), 1ff.; Klaus 
Lüderssen, Produktive Spiegelungen, Vol. 1, Recht und Kriminalistik in der Literatur 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1998); Lüderssen, Produktive Spiegelungen, Vol. 2, Recht 
in Literatur, Theater und Film (Berlin: BWV, 2007).
 27. See Andreas von Arnauld and Wolfgang Durner, “Heinrich Triepel und die Ästhetik des 
Rechts,” in Triepel, Vom Stil des Rechts, p. XI.
 28. Jacob Grimm, “Von der Poesie im Recht,” Zeitschrift für die geschichtliche 
Rechtswissenschaft 2(1) (1816), 25ff.
 29. Hans Fehr, Das Recht im Bilde (Zurich: Erlenbach, 1923); Fehr, Das Recht in der Dichtung 
(Bern: Francke, 1931); and Fehr, Die Dichtung im Recht (Bern: Francke, 1936).
 30. Fehr, Die Dichtung im Recht, pp. 293ff.
 31. On this, see Fehr, op. cit., pp. 240; on poetry in law, see also Klaus Schuhmacher, “Paradies 
– Wüste und zurück? Zur Mythopoetik des Rechts,” in Michael Kilian (ed.), Dichter, Denker 
und der Staat (Tübingen: Attempto, 1993), pp. 263ff., and the contributions in Heinrich 
Scholler and Silvia Tellenbach (eds), Rechtssprichwort und Erzählgut (Berlin: Duncker und 
Humblot, 2002); on legal knowledge stored in spoken language, see also Thomas Vesting, 
Die Medien des Rechts: Sprache (Weilerswist: Velbrück, 2011), p. 101.
 32. Josef Kohler, Shakespeare vor dem Forum der Jurisprudenz, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Rotschild, 
1919); on this, see Rainer Maria Kiesow, “Josef Kohlers Poesie,” in Kiesow et al. (eds), 
1920s Gustav Radbruch called upon jurisprudence, in spite of the “autonomy of the 
domains of culture” that had developed in the meantime, not to neglect the connection that 
these early writings made between law and art. Thus, Radbruch advocated an “aesthetics of 
law” that should reflect specifically on “the peculiar mixture of coldness and passion,” the 
coexistence of the “poverty of a lapidary style” and a “combative sense of justice,” in law.23 
In so arguing, he adopted a double perspective that is also characteristic of later works in 
legal aesthetics24 such as Heinrich Triepel’s treatise “Vom Stil des Rechts”25 in that it, on 
the one hand, analyzes the forms of artistic expression in law and, on the other, simultane-
ously focuses on the law as the subject matter of art.26
Legal aesthetics is pursued in this tradition in the first instance as literary aesthetics of 
law.27 In his text “Von der Poesie im Recht,” Jacob Grimm already pointed out that “law 
and poetry arose from the same bed.”28 As Hans Fehr put it in the 1930s in his trilogy 
“Art and Law,”29 law, like literature, wants to affect its addressees not only at the rational 
but also at the emotional level; it wants to “reach them in the inner recesses of the soul.”30 
Studies on law and poetry that go beyond a mythopoetics of law31 take this as their start-
ing point.32
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Summa: Dieter Simon zum 70. Geburtstag (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2005), 
pp. 297ff.; Sebastian Donat et al., “Zu Geschichte, Formen und Inhalten poetischer 
Gerechtigkeit,” in Donat (ed.), Poetische Gerechtigkeit (Düsseldorf: dup, 2012), pp. 9ff.; 
Susanne Kaul, Poetik der Gerechtigkeit (Munich: Fink, 2008).
 33. From the German literature, the following merit special mention: Erik Wolf, Vom Wesen 
des Rechts in deutscher Dichtung (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1946); Eugen 
Wohlhaupter, Dichterjuristen Vols. 1 to 3 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1953–1957); 
Erich Fechner, Recht und Politik in Adalbert Stifters Witiko (Tübingen: Laupp, 1952); 
Peter Schneider, “… ein einzig Volk von Brüdern”: Recht und Staat in der Literatur 
(Frankfurt am Main: Athenaeum, 1987); on the latter and for a survey of the field of 
law and literature, Peter Häberle, “Begegnungen von Staatsrechtslehre und Literatur,” 
Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 115 (1990), 83ff., 83.
 34. See, for example, the contributions in Michael Freeman und Andrew Lewis (eds), Law 
and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Ian Ward, Law and Literature, 
Possibilities and Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
 35. On international law, see Peter Goodrich, “On the Relational Aesthetics of International 
Law,” Journal of the History of International Law 10 (2008), 321ff.; Ed Morgan, The 
Aesthetics of International Law (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), pp. 116ff.
 36. See, for example, Kieran Dolin, A Critical Introduction to Law and Literature (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007).
 37. See James B. White, “What can a Lawyer learn from Literature?” Harvard Law Review 102 
(1989), 2014ff.
 38. Niklas Luhmann, Theory of Society, 2 vols., trans. Rhodes Barrett (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2012), pp. 141ff.
 39. See already the critique in Rüdiger Lautmann, Justiz: Die stille Gewalt (Frankfurt am Main: 
Fischer, 1972).
 40. On this position, see also Alessandra Asteriti, “Ugly, Dirty and Bad: Working Class 
Aesthetics Reconsidered,” Law & Literature 26 (2014), 191ff., 201; “There is an overlap 
here between the aesthetics of suffering and the aesthetics of legal judgement.”
 41. Arnauld, “Heinrich Triepel und die Ästhetik des Rechts,” in Triepel, Vom Stil des Rechts, 
pp. XXXVIIIf.
 42. From the diverse literature, see Kent Lerch, Lesarten des Rechts: Sprache und Medien 
der Jurisprudenz (Berlin: Avinus-Verlag, 2008); Thomas Seibert, “Der aktuelle Stil der 
juristischen différance,” in Heinrich Plett (ed.), Die Aktualität der Rhetorik (Munich: 
The classical works in legal aesthetics33 – like the law and literature movement34 – engage 
in legal criticism of law.35 Law, legal methodology, and legal decision-making practices 
make use of the forms of rhetoric, art, architecture, and theater.36 A legal aesthetics that starts 
from here aims to use the aesthetic as a leading metaphor for the law – in particular for 
methodology and decision theory.37 Above all, these approaches reject the assumptions that 
conventional theories make about the rational basis of decisions.38 Normative decisions are 
supposed to be rationally justified lege artis with reference to legal norms. But that does not 
mean that normative decisions are in fact made on a rational basis.39 On the contrary, the 
production, justification, and also the consequences of legal decisions have arational as well 
as rational dimensions.40 The conventional understanding of law, which is generally criti-
cized in works in legal aesthetics, truncates the legal process to its objectifiable and rational 
moment and hence takes account of only one segment of the law.41
Reflections on law based on the theory of language also adopt this perspective.42 They 
point to the difficulties in generating binding legal force through language and explore 
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Fink, 1996), pp. 120ff.; Seibert, “Goethe in der Tradition juristischer Rhetorik,” in Klaus 
Lüderssen (ed.), Die wahre Liberalität ist Anerkennung: Goethe und die Jurisprudenz 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999), pp. 319ff.
 43. On this, see the contributions in Peter Brooks and Paul Gerwitz (eds), Law’s Stories: 
Narrative and Rhetoric in Law (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press), 1996; Gerald 
Wetlaufer, “Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse,” Virginia Law Review 76 
(1990), 1545ff.; Katharina Gräfin von Schlieffen, “Rhetorik und rechtsmethodologische 
Aufklärung,” Rechtstheorie 32 (2001), 175ff.; Theodor Viehweg, Topik und Jurisprudenz: 
Ein Beitrag zur rechtswissenschaftlichen Grundlagenforschung (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1954); 
Thomas Seibert, Zeichen. Prozesse: Grenzgänge zur Semiotik des Rechts (Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot, 1996); see also already the contributions in Friedrich Müller (ed.), Untersuchungen 
zur Rechtslinguistik: Interdisziplinäre Studien zu praktischer Semantik und Strukturierender 
Rechtslehre in Grundfragen der juristischen Methodik (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1989).
 44. James Boyd White, Justice as Translation (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1990).
 45. Cornelia Vismann, Das Schöne am Recht (Berlin: Merve, 2012), pp. 7ff.; Marie Theres Fögen, 
Das Lied vom Gesetz (Munich: Carl Friedrich von Siemens Stiftung, 2006); Jerome Frank, 
“Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation,” Columbia Law Review 47 
(1947), 1259ff.; Sanford Levinson and Jack Balkin, “Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts,” 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 139 (1991), 1597ff.; Ulrich Haltern, “Musik (und 
Recht) heute: eine rhapsodische Collage,” in Volker Epping (ed.), Brücken bauen und begehen: 
FS für Knut Ipsen zum 65. Geburtstag (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2000), pp. 651ff.; Peter Gabel and 
Duncan Kennedy, “Roll over Beethoven,” Stanford Law Review 36 (1984), 1ff.; Sara Ramshaw, 
Justice as Improvisation: The Law of the Extempore (London: Routledge, 2013); Desmond 
Manderson, Songs without Music: Aesthetic dimensions of Law and Justice (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 2000); James Parker, “The Musicology of Justice,” in M.J. Grant 
and Férdia J. Stone-Davis (eds), The Soundtrack of Conflict (Hildesheim: Georg Olms; 2013), 
pp. 211ff.; M.J. Grant and Férdia J. Stone-Davis, “The Soundscape of Justice,” Griffith Law 
Review 20 (2011), 962ff.; see also the contributions to the symposium, “The Modes of Law: 
Music and Legal Theory – An Interdisciplinary Workshop,” Cardozo Law Review 20 (1999), 
1325ff.; Bernhard Weck, ‘“Euch werde Lohn in bessern Welten!’ – Ludwig van Beethoven 
und die Entwicklung moderner Menschenrechts- und Verfassungsutopien,” in Hermann Weber 
(ed.), Literatur, Recht und Musik (Berlin: BWV, 2007), pp. 48ff.
 46. See James Parker, “Towards an Acoustic Jurisprudence: Law and the Long Range 
Acoustic Device,” Law, Culture and the Humanities (2015); Günter Hirsch, “Der Richter 
wird’s schon richten,” Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik (2006), 161, and Christoph Möllers, 
“Mehr oder weniger virtuos – Der Mann am Klavier: Was spielt BGH-Präsident Hirsch?,” 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung October 26, 2006, p. 37; on this, see also Bernd Rüthers, 
“Deckel zu! Richter sind keine Pianisten,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung December 
27, 2006, p. 31.
the narrativity of law in its different variants.43 This approach addresses, on the one hand, 
the internal operativity of law but also, on the other, the limitations of language itself: 
translating social conflicts into the language of law, according to this tradition in legal 
aesthetics, estranges these very conflicts.44
Aside from texts from the ambit of literature and law, there are numerous other currents 
that deal with aspects of legal aesthetics – mainly as criticism of the performative aspects 
of law and of the associated obfuscation of techniques of power and domination. For exam-
ple, studies from the field of music and law not only revive Plato’s doctrine of harmony45 
but also make comparisons between legal and musical forms of interpretation.46 Studies 
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 47. Susanne Baer, “Getanzte Konstitutionalisierung: Human Writes und in Menschenrechten 
inbegriffene Ausschlüsse,” Kritische Justiz (2010), 470ff.
 48. Gary Watt, “Law Suits: Clothing as the Image of Law,” in Leif Dahlberg (ed.), Visualizing 
Law and Authority: Essays on Legal Aesthetics (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2012), pp. 23ff.; Angus 
McDonald, “The New Beauty of a Sum of Possibilities,” Law and Critique 8 (1997), 141ff.; 
Christo Stanley, Urban Excess and the Law (London: Routledge-Cavendish, 1996); Peter 
Winn, “Legal Ritual,” in Roberta Kevelson (ed.), Law and Aesthetics (New York: Peter Lang, 
1992), pp. 401ff.
 49. Cornelia Vismann, “Vor ihren Richtern nackt,” in Friedrich Kittler and Cornelia Vismann, 
Internationaler Merve-Diskurs Nr. 240: Vom Griechenland (Berlin: Merve, 2001), pp. 39ff.
 50. See the contributions in Leif Dahlberg (ed.), Visualizing Law and Authority: Essays on 
Legal Aesthetics (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2012); Costas Douzinas and Lynda Nead (eds), Law 
and the Image: The authority of Art and the Aesthetics of Law (London and Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 1999); Linda Merrill, A Pot of Paint: Aesthetics on Trial in 
Whistler v. Ruskin (Washington, DC: Smithsonian, 1993); Les Moran, “Transcript and 
Truth: Writing the Trials of Oscar Wilde,” in Joseph Bristow (ed.), Oscar Wilde and Modern 
Culture: The Making of a Legend (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2008), pp. 234ff.; 
Günter Frankenberg, “Der normative Blick: Recht, Ethik und Ästhetik der Bilderverbote,” 
in Günter Frankenberg and Peter Niesen (eds), Bilderverbot: Zu Recht, Ethik und Ästhetik 
der öffentlichen Darstellung (Münster: LIT, 2004), pp. 1ff.
 51. Horst Bredekamp, Thomas Hobbes visuelle Strategien: Der Leviathan: Das Urbild des mod-
ernen Staates und seine Gegenbilder (Berlin: Akademie, 1999), pp. 56ff.; for a classical account, 
see Zenon Bankowski and Geoff Maugham, Images of Law (London: Routledge, 1976).
 52. Thomas Keenan and Eyal Weizman, Mengele’s Skull: The Advent of a Forensic Aesthetics 
(Berlin: Sternberg, 2012).
 53. George Karavokyris, “The Art of Law,” Law & Critique 25 (2014), 67ff.; Igor Stramignoni, 
“Seizing Truths: Art, Politics, Law,” in Oren Ben-Dor (ed.), Law and Art: Justice, Ethics 
and Aesthetics (New York: Routledge, 2011), pp. 73ff.
 54. Piyel Haldar, “Acoustic Justice,” in Lionel Bently and Leo Flynn (eds), Law and the Senses: 
Sensational Justice (London: Pluto Press, 1996), pp. 123ff.; Haldar, “The Function of 
Ornament in Quintillian, Alberti and Court Architecture,” in Douzinas and Nead, Law and 
the Image, pp. 117ff.; Linda Mulcahy, Legal Architecture: Justice, Due Process and the 
Place of Law (London: Routledge, 2011); see also the contributions in Jonathan Simon, 
Nicholas Temple, and Renée Tobe (eds), Architecture and Justice: Judicial Meanings in the 
Public Realm (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013).
 55. Steve Greenfield, Guy Osborn, and Peter Robson, Film and the Law: The Cinema of Justice 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010); Austin Sarat et al., Law on the Screen (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2005); Desmond Manderson, Kangaroo Courts and the Rule of 
Law (London: Routledge, 2012).
 56. Richard Sherwin, Visualizing Law in the Age of Digital Neo-Baroque (London: Routledge, 2011).
 57. Andreas von Arnauld, “Recht – Spiel – Magie,” in idem (ed.), Recht und Spielregeln 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), pp. 101ff. (102f.). For further references, see ibid.
that go beyond this stress the relations between law and dance.47 Situationist analyses 
address law as a spectacle48 and the relationship between law and theater.49 Contributions 
from the field of law and image50 uncover the visual strategies of legal discourse51 and 
forensic practice.52 Other studies shed light on the connection between law and the visual 
arts,53 law and architecture,54 law and film,55 law and new media,56 and on law and play.57
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 58. Jack M. Balkin, “Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice,” Michigan Law 
Review 92 (1994), 1131ff.
 59. From the perspective of Critical Legal Studies: Roberto Unger, Passion (New York: Free 
Press, 1984).
 60. See the contributions in Peter Goodrich (ed.), Law and the Unconscious: A Legendre Reader 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999).
 61. Law, as described by Richard Sherwin, consists of “powerful impersonal forces, strange 
forms of reason, and unfamiliar ritual practices” (When Law goes Pop: The Vanishing Line 
between Law and Popular Culture [Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2000], p. 191).
 62. To cite just one, representative example, Eugen Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the 
Sociology of Law (1931), trans. Walter Lewis Moll (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Publishers, 2009), pp. 486ff.
 63. Christoph Menke, Force: A Fundamental Concept of Aesthetic Anthropology, trans. Gerrit 
Jackson (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), p. 8.
 64. Allen Mendenhall, “Dissent as Site of Aesthetic Adaptation in the Work of Oliver Wendell 
Holmes Jr.,” British Journal of American Legal Studies 1 (2012), 517ff.; on law as an “anti-
rational, almost mystical concept,” see Daniel J. Boorstin, The Mysterious Science of the Law: 
Essays on Blackstone’s Commentaries (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 99.
 65. See Josef Esser, Vorverständnis und Methodenwahl in der Rechtsfindung, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt 
am Main: Athenäum-Fischer, 1972).
 66. See also Carol Sanger, “Legislating with Affect: Emotions and Legislative Law Making,” 
in James E. Fleming (ed.), Passions and Emotions: Nomos LIII (New York: NYU Press, 
2013), pp. 38ff.; Malte Gruber, “Normen der Empathie: Zur Einfühlung,” in Malte Grube and 
Stefan Häußler (eds), Normen der Empathie (Berlin: trafo Wissenschaftsverlag, 2012), pp. 
9ff.; András Sajó, Constitutional Sentiments (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011); 
on the emergence of the 1848 “Declaration of Rights and Sentiments” that should be men-
tioned in this context, see Lisa Tetraut, The Myth of Seneca Falls: Memory of the Women’s 
Suffrage Movement (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2014).
 67. Colette Brunschwig, “Multisensory Law and Legal Informatics – A Comparison of 
How These Legal Disciplines Relate to Visual Law,” in Anton Geistet et al. (eds), 
Strukturierung der Juristischen Semantik – Structuring Legal Semantics, Festschrift für 
Erich Schweighofer (Bern: Editions Weblaw, 2011), pp. 573ff.; for a critical position, see 
Klaus Röhl, “Zur Rede vom multisensorischen Recht,” Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie 33 
(2013), 51ff. That “the legally relevant characteristics are of a tangible nature” was already 
emphasized by Max Weber: “The adherence to external characteristics of the facts, for 
instance, the utterance of certain words, the execution of a signature, or the performance 
of a certain symbolic act with a fixed meaning, represents the most rigorous type of legal 
formalism” (Weber, Economy and Society, p. 657).
The prevalent basic tenor of these studies is that law is influenced by arational forces58 
which can lend passions59 and the subconscious60 force in the law.61 This is precisely 
what studies on the sense of justice and emotionalism in law have always claimed.62 The 
suspicion that there is an unconscious force at work in law that “has the ability to take the 
intellect’s place in the making of a judgement”63 can be found in many different versions 
in legal methodology:64 Carl Schmitt’s decisionism ex nihilo takes this as its starting 
point, Josef Esser’s notion of preunderstanding,65 sociological studies of lawyers – all of 
these approaches seek to uncover and explain in methodological terms the share of the 
non-rational in legal decisions.66 Current studies on multisensory law67 and on the haptic 
10 Law, Culture and the Humanities 
 68. Alison Young, “Arrested by the Image,” New York Law School Law Review (2012), 77ff.
 69. Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, ed. and trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. 
Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 156 (A 21 B 36); a classical 
“aesthetic” reading of Kant can be found in Gilles Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy: the 
Doctrine of the Faculties, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis, 
MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).
 70. Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense,” in Walter Kaufmann 
(ed.), The Portable Nietzsche (New York: Viking, 1954), pp. 42ff.
 71. Niklas Luhmann, “Das Paradox der Menschenrechte und drei Formen seiner Entfaltung,” 
in Luhmann, Soziologische Aufklärung, 3rd ed. (Wiesbaden: VS, 2008), pp. 229ff., p. 234; 
Luhmann, Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft.
 72. Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social System, trans. Klaus Ziegert (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), p. 484.
 73. See the contributions in Friedrich Müller and Rainer Wimmer (eds), Neue Studien zur 
Rechtslinguistik (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001); also Friedrich Müller, Ralph 
Christensen, and Michael Sokolowski, Rechtstext und Textarbeit (Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot, 1997); Sabine Müller-Mall, Performative Rechtserzeugung: Eine theoretische 
Annäherung (Weilerswist: Velbrück, 2012).
 74. But for such an argument, see Joseph Hutcheson, “The Judgment Intuitive: The Function 
of the ‘Hunch’ in Judicial Decision,” Cornell Law Quarterly 14 (1929), 274ff.; Julia Hänni, 
Vom Gefühl am Grund der Rechtsfindung (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2011), p. 168; 
Albert Ehrenzweig, Psychoanalytic Jurisprudence: On Ethics, Aesthetics, and “Law” 
(Leiden: Oceana Publications, 1971), p. 153.
 75. Niklas Luhmann, “Weltkunst,” in Jürgen Gerhards (ed.), Soziologie der Kunst (Opladen: 
VS, 1997), pp. 55ff., p.70; see also Luhmann, Die Wirtschaft der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp, 1988), p. 122, n. 56: “Intuition had been always a faculty of higher beings 
– formerly of angels, today of elites.” On implicit knowledge, see also Gerd Gigerenzer, Gut 
Feelings: The Intelligence of the Unconscious (New York: Viking Penguin, 2007).
 76. See, in this sense, also Jacques Derrida, “Force and Significance,” in Derrida, Writing and 
Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 1ff.
 77. However, he ultimately subordinated imagination to the faculty of logic (Immanuel Kant, 
Critique of the Power of Judgement, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews [Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000], §35, p. 167; Ak. 5: 287).
dimension of legal aesthetics68 take up this point: they argue that law-making and 
legal decision-making, aside from their rational dimension, also have a non-rational 
moment.
The identification of these kinds of basic aesthetic processes is a shared feature of 
such diverse concepts as Kant’s “transcendental aesthetic,”69 Nietzsche’s aesthetic phi-
losophy (“the drive to truth,” the “sense of truth”),70 and Niklas Luhmann’s decision 
theory.71 Luhmann’s appeal to “sound judgment in relation to legal taste”72 insists that 
normative decision-making as a general rule is neither a purely cognitive process of rec-
ognizing correct law73 nor a matter of retrospectively concealing the exercise of institu-
tional power with reasons:74 “Only angels or fanatics can get by without distinctions 
– that is, with intuition.”75
Rational and non-rational drives come together in normative decision-making.76 
Kant already anticipated the combination of rational and arational forces77 when he 
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 78. So also Ino Augsberg, ‘“Das moralische Gefühl in mir’: Zu Kants Konzeption menschli-
cher Freiheit und Würde als Auto-Heteronomie,” Juristenzeitung 68 (2013), 533ff.; see also 
Rudolf Makkreel, “Relating Kant’s Theory of Reflective Judgment to the Law,” Washington 
University Jurisprudence Review 6 (2013), 147ff.; Douglas Edlin, “Kant and the Common 
Law: Intersubjectivity in Aesthetic and Legal Judgment,” Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence 23 (2010), 429ff.
 79. George Karavokyris, “The Art of Law,” Law & Critique 25 (2014), 67ff.; Todd Kesselman, 
“The Critique of Judgement: An interest in the Impossible,” Washington University 
Jurisprudence Review 6 (2013), 59ff.
 80. Christoph Menke, Die Kraft der Kunst (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2013), p. 70.
 81. For a critique of various forms of arbitrariness, see also Benjamin Kram, “Rumpelstilzchen,” 
Rechtsgeschichte (2008), 237ff., 237, “… until one has reached the combination ‘Law and 
Rumpelstilzchen’.” See also already Dieter Simon, “Knäule,” Rechtsgeschichte (2006), 
213ff., 216f.; also the critique in Richard Posner, Law and Literature. A misunderstood 
Relation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), p. 79.
 82. For an early account: Karl N. Llewellyn, “On the Good, the True, the Beautiful in 
Law,” University of Chicago Law Review 9 (1942), pp. 224ff.; from the literature 
in German, Peter Lerche, “Stil, Methode, Ansicht: Polemische Bemerkungen zum 
Methodenproblem,” Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt (1961), 690ff.; Paul Kirchhof, 
“Sprachstil und System als Geltungsbedingung des Gesetzes,” Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift (2002), 2760ff.
 83. See also Menke, Recht und Gewalt, p. 40, who locates the force of law in this difference.
conceived of the aesthetic judgment of taste as “the agreement of two powers of 
representation: namely, the imagination … and the understanding.”78 It is this non-
hierarchical unity in difference between the faculty and the power of judgment that 
is characteristic of aesthetic, and hence also of legal differentiation.79 On the one 
hand, rational reflection is receptive to aesthetic-sensuous perception; on the other 
hand, rationally reflecting judgment becomes an object of aesthetic-instantaneous 
expression.80
II. Sociological Aesthetics of Law
However, the distinctive contribution of the traditional approaches to “law and aesthet-
ics” to our understanding of law is sometimes rather limited.81 Granted, they often man-
aged to expose the rationality assumptions of law as mythologizations and to reveal the 
implications for a theory of power concealed by these performances. However, much of 
this work remains at the level of such external criticism of law and does not draw any 
conclusions for legal practice. The parallel references back to legal practice often end in 
a contribution to methodology and the general theory of legislation that calls for taking 
account of aesthetic criteria – such as coherence and choice of language – in the legisla-
tive process.82 If we want to broaden the perspective of these studies, then we must find 
ways to inscribe aesthetic reflection into law. Such reflection must thematize the rela-
tion between the autonomous domain of law and its other, non-law, from within law 
itself.83 If we want to criticize instrumental or functionalist rationality, then this is pos-
sible only in the medium of this rationality, through its own self-reflection.
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 84. Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, Aesthetica (1750) (Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1961); German 
translation: Ästhetik, trans. and ed. Dagmar Mirbach, 2 vols. (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007).
 85. Menke, Force, p. ix; Norbert Schneider, Geschichte der Ästhetik von der Aufklärung bis zur 
Postmoderne, 5th ed. (Stuttgart: Reclaim, 2010), pp. 251ff.
 86. See the critique in Rainer Maria Kiesow, “Ach ist das Recht schön! Ach…,” myops 21 
(2014), 60ff.
 87. Theodor W. Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music, trans. E. B. Ashton (New 
York: Continuum, 1988), p. 207. This provides the starting point for Jürgen Habermas, who 
criticizes Horkheimer and Adorno on the grounds that their analysis of “aesthetic moder-
nity” drawing on Nietzsche has led to “uninhibited scepticism regarding reason” (“The 
Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment: Horkheimer and Adorno,” in Habermas, The 
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence 
[Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990], pp. 106ff., p. 129). This fails to recognize the dialecti-
cal strain in Adorno’s aesthetic sociology, which does not play arationality and rationality 
off against each other, but instead combines them. Adorno’s critique of Georg Lukács (The 
Destruction of Reason [Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1981]) should also be 
understood in this sense (“Extorted Reconciliation,” in Adorno, Notes to Literature, Vol. 1, 
trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen [New York: Columbia University Press, 1991], pp. 216ff., 
pp. 217f.; see also Terry Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic [Oxford: Blackwell, 1990], 
pp. 341ff.).
 88. Theodor W. Adorno, “Some Ideas on the Sociology of Music,” in Adorno, Sound Figures, 
trans. Rodney Livingstone (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 1ff., p. 5. 
“But rationalization represents … only one of the social features of music, just as rationality 
itself, Enlightenment, is no more than one aspect of the history of a society.”
1 Sociological aesthetics
The aesthetic perspective focuses on the reflexivity of the aesthetic. Ontological 
approaches take the aesthetic object – in other words, art, nature, or the sublime – as a 
basis for developing aesthetics. Since Baumgarten they have been based on a theory of 
the sense faculties of the subject who is attentive to the aesthetic aspects of these objects.84 
Recent approaches, by contrast, proceed in the opposite direction: according to them, 
aesthetics as a theory of the aesthetic first gives rise to the object as something “aes-
thetic.”85 At the center of the aesthetic search process, therefore, is not the aesthetics of 
elements but the aesthetics of relations.
Sociological theories of aesthetics do not adopt an ontological perspective either. 
Their aim is not to heighten the aesthetic in social structures86 but instead to uncover the 
duality of processes of social rationalization and to describe the relationship between the 
differentiated spheres of rationality, on the one hand, and society and human beings, on 
the other. This motif is especially prominent in Theodor W. Adorno’s sociology of music 
where Adorno refers to Max Weber’s rationalization thesis, but corrects it by insisting 
that rationality can develop “only by reflection on the social totality that finds expression 
in the special mental fields as well as in all areas separated from each other by a division 
of labor.”87 By aesthetics Adorno understands schematic reflection on the relationship 
between the individual domains of social rationality and the totality of society, together 
with the associated attentiveness also to the non-rational.88 His material morphology 
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Musik und Ästhetik 64 (2012), 88ff., 95.
 90. On this relation, see Christoph Menke, Kritik der Rechte (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2015), pp. 122ff.
 91. Thus, for Jean Marie Guyau the aesthetic character of sense impressions has less to do with 
their essential content than with their form. (Jean Marie Guyau, L’art au point de vue soci-
ologique (1889) [Paris: Fayard, 2001]; cf. Kurt Blaukopf, Musik im Wandel der Gesellschaft 
[Munich: DTV, 1984], pp. 296ff.).
 92. See already Parsons, who at first conceived of sociology at the science of the nonrational (as 
opposed to rational action), though in his later work he stressed the equal importance and 
interwovenness of rational and nonrational constitutive moments; see Talcott Parsons and 
Gerald Platt, The American University (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973), 
p. 93, and the instructive account in Rudolf Stichweh, “Rationalität bei Parsons,” Zeitschrift 
für Soziologie 9 (1980), 54ff., 60 and 73.
 93. Georg Simmel, “Soziologische Ästhetik” (1896), in Simmel, Soziologische Ästhetik 
(Bodenheim: Philo, 1998), pp. 77ff., p. 81.
 94. Andreas Reckwitz, “Praktiken und ihre Affekte,” Mittelweg 36 (2015), 27ff.; Helmut 
Staubmann, Die Kommunikation von Gefühlen: Ein Beitrag zur Soziologie der Ästhetik 
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1995).
 95. See Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, “Atmospheres of Law: Senses, Affects, 
Lawscapes,” Emotion, Space and Society 7 (2013), 35ff.; Terry A. Maroney, “Law and 
Emotion,” Law Hum Behav 30 (2006), 119ff.
 96. See Julia Chryssostalis et al. (eds), “Introduction: Law and Taste,” Non Liquet: The Westminster 
Online Working Papers Series, Law and the Senses Series, The Taste Issue 2013, pp. 3ff.; see 
also the contributions in Lionel Bently and Leo Flynn (eds), Law and the Senses: Sensational 
Jurisprudence (London: Pluto, 1996); Bernard J. Hibbitts, ‘“Coming To Our Senses’: 
Communication and Legal Expression in Performance Cultures,” Emory Law Journal 41 (1992), 
873ff.; Emily Grabham, “Shaking Mr Jones: Law and Touch,” International Journal of Law in 
Context 5 (2009), 343ff.; Davina Cooper, “Reading the State as a Multi-Identity Formation: The 
Touch and Feel of Equality Governance,” Feminist Legal Studies 19 (2011), 3ff.
traces the arational in the rationalized world taking music as its guide. Adorno uses musi-
cal relationships to illustrate how society can be organized in an emancipatory way.89
From this perspective, aesthetics and social spheres such as law do not constitute mutually 
exclusive domains that could be connected through an arbitrary combination of “law and aes-
thetics.” On the contrary, the analysis of the aesthetic dimensions of law leads to the question 
of the relationship between law and society and human beings and of how the relation between 
the material and the form of law90 is configured.91 Sociological legal aesthetics enriches the 
existing perspectives on this relationship through the inclusion of sensuousness. Social sys-
tems, on this conception, consist not only of meaning but also of the sensuous.92 Sociological 
aesthetics since Georg Simmel is geared to the fact that, notwithstanding the imposition of 
rational form, “life remains instinctive, emotional, and irrational.”93 Without reducing the sym-
metry between the rational and the arational to either of its two components, the aim of socio-
logical aesthetics is to explore how affective processes and structures are integral parts of 
social systems and how these systems in turn exert effects back on affective processes.94
Here an analysis in legal aesthetics can connect up with the discussion on emotion-
alism in law95 and on legal taste.96 Aesthetic reflection on law can contribute to 
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 97. Helmut Staubmann, Ästhetik – Aisthetik – Emotionen: Soziologische Essays (Konstanz: 
UVK, 2008), p. 21; on force, see Menke, Force, pp. 316ff.; on the sociology of emotions, 
see Ben Highmore, “Bitter after Taste, Affect, Food, and Social Aesthetics,” in Melissa 
Gregg et al. (ed.), The Affect Theory Reader (London: Duke University Press, 2010), 
pp. 118ff.; Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (London: 
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in Joachim Fischer et al. (eds), Kultursoziologie im 21. Jahrhundert (Wiesbaden: Springer 
VS, 2014), pp. 267ff.
 98. From a systematic perspective, see Veith Selk and Karsten Malowitz, “Angst in Bielefeld: 
Über ein ausgeschlossenes Gefühl in der Systemtheorie,” Mittelweg 36 (2015), 92ff.; Luc 
Ciompi, “Ein blinder Fleck bei Niklas Luhmann? Soziale Wirkungen von Emotionen aus 
Sicht der fraktalen Affektlogik,” Soziale Systeme 10 (2004), 21ff.; see also Fritz Simon, 
“Zur Systemtheorie der Emotionen,” Soziale Systeme 10 (2004), 111ff.; Michael Urban, 
“Systemtheoretische Annäherungen an das Konzept der Emotionen,” in Annette Schnabel 
et al. (eds), Emotionen, Sozialstruktur und Moderne (Wiesbaden: VS, 2012), pp. 93ff.
 99. Whereas not only the Scottish moral philosophy insists on the correlation of moral senti-
ments and law, but also contemporary approaches: see e.g. Richard Rorty, “Human Rights, 
Rationality and Sentimentality,” in Stephen Shute et al. (eds), On Human Rights (New 
York: Basic Books, 1994), pp. 115ff.; José Manuel Barreto, “Ethics of Emotions as Ethics 
of Human Rights. A Jurisprudence of Sympathy in Adorno, Horkheimer and Rorty,” Law 
and Critique 17 (2006), 73ff.; for the Scottish moral philosophy, though this takes the moral 
subject as its point of departure: Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) (New 
York: Garland, 1971); on this Ulli Rühl, Moralischer Sinn und Sympathie: Der Denkweg der 
schottischen Aufklärung in der Moral- und Rechtsphilosophie (Paderborn: mentis, 2005).
100. See already the finding in Richard F. Wolfson, “Aesthetics in and about the Law,” Kentucky 
Law Journal 33 (1944–45), 33ff.
101. Cf. Christoph Möllers, Die Möglichkeit der Normen (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2015), pp. 238ff.
102. Susanne Bleich, “Die literarische und die juristische Hermeneutik: Ein Vergleich,” Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift 42 (1989), 3197ff. (3199); see also Heinz Wagner, “Interpretation 
in Literatur- und Rechtswissenschaft,” Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 165 (1965), 520ff., 
551: “Aesthetics is not a legal concept; aesthetic categories do not provide standards for 
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refining legal awareness of emotions, feelings, and unconscious forces97 at work in the 
social systems.98
2 The aesthetic constitution of law
Whereas a wide range of metaphysical, ethical, and logical theories of justification have 
been developed for law,99 to date no attempt has been made to evolve a comparable the-
ory that would provide a systematic analysis of the aesthetic constitution of law.100
Jurisprudence, at least as regards its dogmatic aspects, has been reluctant to open 
itself up to legal aesthetics.101 For a long time the dominant reflex was to reject aesthetic 
analyses as extra-juridical and to insist that “aesthetics describes an essential aspect of 
the content of literature, whereas normativity is the decisive dimension of the content of 
legal texts.”102 It would indeed be inappropriate to equate aesthetic and judicial 
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communication directly, because a sociological aesthetics of law cannot claim to develop 
standards for law from the outside which law would nevertheless have to internalize. 
However, through a reflective movement from within legal form itself, sociological aes-
thetics of law can cast new light on the other of the rationality of the law, on its repressed 
and often unthematized sides.103 Its instruments enable reflection on how rational and 
non-rational forces – hence the aesthetic dimensions of the constitution of reality – oper-
ate in law. Approaches along these lines have indeed been developed, especially in works 
that explore the connections between ethics and aesthetics.104 The result concerns a 
structural coupling of sociological aesthetics as a science with the legal system – in other 
words, an aesthetic elucidation of the law which has the potential to refine the modes of 
perception and the decision-making programs of the law.105
Here studies in legal aesthetics as a general rule pursue a negativistic approach.106 In 
an attempt to unmask and deconstruct the mystical foundations of authority,107 they 
demystify legal juggling with dogmatics and concepts: “Disenchantment of the legal 
world, twilight of the gods and of the idols, demythologizing, for the sake of the human 
being and hence also of the law.”108 They oppose the “gigantic, radiant empty formulas,” 
decode “fake but seductive justifications”109 of law, and focus instead on possible signs 
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110. Ludger Schwarte, Vom Urteilen: Gesetzlosigkeit, Geschmack, Gerechtigkeit (Berlin: Merve, 
2012).
111. Gustav Radbruch, “Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht,” Süddeutsche 
Juristenzeitung (1946), 105ff.
112. Triepel, Vom Stil des Rechts, pp. 150ff.
113. Martti Koskenniemi, “International Law in Europe, Between Tradition and Renewal,” 
European Journal of International Law 16 (2005), 113ff. (122).
114. Luhmann, “Das Paradox der Menschenrechte und drei Formen seiner Entfaltung,” pp. 
229ff., p. 234.
115. Cf. Hauke Brunkhorst, “Ästhetik als Gesellschaftskritik,” Widerspruch 41 (2003), 12ff., 
16; Lucia Sziborsky, Rettung des Hoffnungslosen: Untersuchungen zur Ästhetik und 
Musikphilosophie Theodor W. Adornos (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1994), pp. 94ff.; 
Christoph Menke, Die Gegenwart der Tragödie: Versuch über Urteil und Spiel (Frankfurt 
am Main: Suhrkamp, 2005), pp. 203ff.
116. Josef Früchtl, Mimesis – Konstellation eines Zentralbegriffs bei Adorno (Würzburg: 
Königshausen & Neumann, 1986), p. 35.
of tastelessness in the law.110 Thus, Heinrich Triepel, for example, read the Radbruch 
formula111 against the moral grain in an aesthetic sense and, with reference to the 
Nuremberg racial laws, disputed the external effectiveness of ugly law filled with disgust 
and revulsion.112 Similarly, Martti Koskenniemi has advocated applying the distinction 
between art and kitsch to the law in order to expose kitschy and false forms of law. The 
latter, according to Koskenniemi, are at work, for example, when law is invoked “to 
defend the easy truth, the nostalgic feel for an abstract mankind, and to curtain off 
death.”113 Niklas Luhmann also has the aesthetics of the law in mind when, with refer-
ence to blatant violations of law, he criticizes it as “tasteless” in the face of atrocities “to 
consult texts or to inspect the local legal system to determine whether such practices are 
permitted.”114
A sociological aesthetics of the law that proceeds in this manner is not reduced to 
demonstrating which aesthetic expressions the law chooses, how theatrical it is, or how 
closely legal interpretation tracks musical interpretation. Rather, it unfolds its legal and 
social critical potential by facilitating a relationship conceived by Adorno as the relation-
ship between critical subjectivity and systemic violence, by Habermas as the interde-
pendence of lifeworld and system, and by Menke as the difference between the human 
being and the social subject.115 The point is to establish what possibilities exist for organ-
izing social relations in humane ways – while eschewing the insufficiently complex 
approaches of natural law or rational law, which developed the normative a priori of 
social order from supposedly essential features of human nature or human reason. What 
is needed is instead a further stage of complexity: only if we recognize the ineluctability 
of the difference between human being and society will it become possible to relate them 
to each other in anything approaching an adequate way. The call for a humane law, there-
fore, is not a call to resolve the existing contradictions and disharmonies, but to give 
them free play in law.
Here Adorno’s aesthetic theory, in particular, which takes up Durkheim’s idea of the 
fait social, offers the key insight that a “corrective correlate” must be introduced into the 
differentiated social formations116 in order to break open the paradigm of rationality and 
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117. See also Adorno’s Kranichsteiner lectures published in Theodor W. Adorno, Kranichsteiner 
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concept of mimesis in René Girard, Violence and Sacred, trans. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore, 
MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), though Girard’s concept is non-dialectical 
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tension, see also Horst Hansen, Die kopernikanische Wende in die Ästhetik: Ernst Bloch und 
der Geist seiner Zeit (Würzburg: Königshausen and Neumann, 1998), p. 206.
119. Theodor W. Adorno, Alban Berg: Master of the Smallest Link, trans. Juliane Brand and 
Christopher Hailey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 7. And on Arnold 
Schoenberg’s melodrama “A Survivor from Warsaw,” in which the threat of anti-Semitism 
is made palpable by the musical form, Adorno writes: “The genuinely revolutionary ele-
ment in his music is the transformation of the function of expression. Passions are no longer 
faked; on the contrary, corporeal impulses of the unconscious, shocks, traumas are reg-
istered undisguised in the medium of music. They attack the taboos of the form because 
these taboos submit the impulses to their censorship and rationalize them … Real suffering 
has left them [the bloodstains] behind in the artwork as a sign that it no longer recognizes 
the latter’s autonomy.” (Theodor W. Adorno, The Philosophy of New Music, trans. Robert 
Hullot-Kentor [Minneapolis, MN and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2006], p. 35) 
(translation amended).
120. Karl Marx, “Concerning Feuerbach,” in Marx, Early Writings, trans. Rodney Livingstone 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975), pp. 421ff., Thesis VI, p. 423.
121. Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Rechtskraft (Berlin: August, 2013); on the interdependence of 
social and human forces, see also Gilles Deleuze, “To Have Done with Judgement,” in 
Essays. Critical and Clinical, trans. D.W. Smith (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1997), pp. 126ff.
to subject the social spheres to the requirement of humaneness.117 Adorno expressed this 
idea in the concept of mimesis.118 Thus in a study on Alban Berg he calls for restoring 
“human dignity to a banished, heretical yearning.”119 Such a form of mimesis is anti-
essentialist. It will not resolve the incommensurabilities but will call for a form of inter-
relating that reflects on its relation to the human being as an “ensemble of the social 
relations”120 without dissolving the non-identities in identities.
III. Legal Practice
A mimetic responsiveness of law to its environment will not lead to the dissolution of the 
difference between law and non-law. The differentiation of law is irreversible. Therefore, 
mimesis of law does not aim to level down differences in a harmonistic way, but instead 
to reflect what is external to the law in the law in sophisticated ways. It aims at a form of 
law that is aware that law is receptive to and affirms rational and arational forces. It is 
also affected by these forces.121
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122. But see Lorenz von Stein, Gegenwart und Zukunft der Rechts- und Staatswissenschaft 
Deutschlands (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1876), p. VII: “The science of law is not jurisprudence but 
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Massumi (New York: Continuum, 1987); cf. Robert Seyfert, Das Leben der Institutionen: 
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124. See Mirko Wischke, “Eine negativ gewendete Ethik des richtigen Lebens?,” in 
Schweppenhäuser et al. (eds), Impuls und Negativität (Hamburg: Argument, 1995), pp. 
29ff., pp. 34f.
125. Theodor W. Adorno, “Education after Auschwitz,” in Adorno, Critical Models: Interventions 
and Catchwords, trans. Henry W. Pickford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 
p. 202; see also Günter Figal, “Absolut modern: Zu Adornos Verständnis von Freiheit und 
Kunst,” in Richard Klein et al. (eds), Mit den Ohren denken: Adornos Philosophie der 
Musik (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1998), pp. 21ff.
126. “Transsubjective” here has not only an institutional, but also a humane meaning (see the 
contributions in Thomas Vesting et al. (eds), Grundrechte als Phänomene kollektiver 
Ordnung [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014]). For this conception, see already Ludwig Raiser, 
“Der Stand der Lehre vom subjektiven Recht im Deutschen Zivilrecht,” Juristenzeitung 16 
(1961), 465ff., 472: “The possibility to develop one’s own powers and the opportunity to 
obtain economic benefits thereby should not be understood as subjective rights vis-à-vis 
competitors and customers.”
The corresponding science of law is a science of force. We must also avoid misinter-
preting this in essentialistic terms. It is not about developing an ontology of legal force 
in order to derive specific legal contents from the existence of social and human forces.122 
Rather, the point is, on the one hand, to understand how emotions and forces as potenti-
alities suspend the everyday routines of the law; on the other hand, the challenge is to 
develop a sense for the effects that law exerts on these affects and forces.123
This is what Adorno is referring to when he attributes to “those driving forces that 
erupt and rebel against the horrific – such as the suffering of others” the power to create 
a form of social existence fit for human beings124 and when he stresses that a humane 
societal order can be established “only when the drives of people are no longer repressed, 
but fulfilled and released.”125 In other words, reflection on the dialectic of rational and 
arational forces enables us to thematize the legal violence of a law “without feeling” 
through its confrontation with a legal force that opposes this violence and liberates 
human and social forces.
The point of this sociological aesthetics is that aesthetic reflection on social processes 
can, on the one hand, throw light on the dialectical processes of law as an arational sys-
tem of rationality. But, on the other hand, it also makes it possible to conceive of law in 
a new transsubjective form.126 The point of reference of aesthetics is not the moral, politi-
cal, or legal subject, but the human being. Humanity is not exhausted in being a subject. 
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Society (Los Angeles, CA: Pine Forge, 2011), pp. 143ff.
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Kulturtheorie, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Aisthesis, 2012), pp. 281ff.
129. As such they represent an “aesthetics from below”; on this, see Richard Klein, 
“Überschreitungen, immanente und transzendente Kritik,” in Adolf Nowak et al. (eds), 
Musikalische Analyse und Kritische Theorie: Zu Adornos Philosophie der Musik (Tutzing: 
Hans Schneider, 2007), pp. 276ff., p. 277.
130. Andreas Reckwitz, Die Erfindung der Kreativität: Zum Prozess gesellschaftlicher 
Ästhetisierung (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2012); see also Michael Hutter, “Cultural Conditions 
of Creation,” in Hubert Knoblauch et al. (eds), Culture, Communication, and Creativity 
(Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2014), pp. 35ff.
131. See Michel Foucault, who contrasts this aesthetics of existence with an ethics of existence 
(Ästhetik der Existenz, Frankfurt am Main, 2007, pp. 280ff.); see also Rahel Jaeggi, Kritik 
von Lebensformen (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2014), p. 57, and Bruno Latour, An Inquiry into 
Modes of Existence: An Anthropology of the Moderns, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), pp. 1ff.
132. Paul Stenner speaks in terms of “rights filled out with affective content, or as affect shaped 
into the patterns of rights” (“Is Autopoietic Systems Theory Alexithymic? Luhmann and 
the Socio-Psychology of Emotions,” Soziale Systeme 10 (2004), 159ff., 175); see also Hans 
Joas, The Sacredness of the Person: A New Genealogy of Human Rights, trans. Alex Skinner 
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press), p. 171: “the sense of self evidence and 
affective intensity.”
133. On the connection between factual and legal desire, see already Georg Simmel, “Conflict,” 
in Simmel, Conflict and The Web of Group Affiliations, trans. Kurt H. Wolff and Reinhard 
Bendix (New York: Free Press, 1955), pp. 11ff. (p. 53): “In fact, the double meaning of 
‘claim’ – simple desire and legally grounded desire – alludes to the fact that the will likes to 
increase the right of its strength by the strength of its right.” On the sociology of desire, see 
also Gabriel Tarde, The Laws of Imitation, trans. Elsie Clews Parson (New York: H. Holt 
and Company, 1903); and Jean-Philippe Antoine, “Tardes Ästhetik,” in Christian Borch 
et al. (eds), Soziologie der Nachahmung und des Begehrens (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
2009), pp. 164ff.
Human freedom is not the same thing as the freedom of the liberal subject. An aesthetics 
of law along these lines tries to answer the central question of how law as the “primal 
phenomenon of irrational rationality” can be subjected to the ideal of human 
freedom.127
The aesthetic enlightenment128 of law starts from social structures.129 Different crea-
tive mechanisms have taken shape in the sectors of science, religion, and art130 that regu-
late the development of human and social forces and affects and make room for the 
“aesthetics of existence.”131 Law reproduces these mechanisms and is affected by them 
in turn: justice is “sought,”132 courts are required to investigate the Begehr (“desire”) of 
the claimant see §88 of the German Code of Administrative Court Procedure (VwGO).133
Law and the non-rational are interwoven in the various processes in which law and 
different social spheres co-evolve. It would be mistaken to take this intrication as a rea-
son to raise an idealized affective tone into a normative yardstick that applies across 
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the basic model of social recognition in Axel Honneth (Freedom’s Right: The Social 
Foundations of Democratic Life, trans. Joseph Ganahl [New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2013]).
135. Jocelyn Pixley, “Emotions and Economics,” in Jack Barbalet (ed.), Emotions and Sociology 
(Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2002), pp. 69ff.
136. Talcott Parsons, “The Motivation of Economic Activities,” in Parsons, Essays in Sociological 
Theory (New York: Free Press, 1954), pp. 50ff.; Dirk Baecker, “Volkszählung,” in Baecker 
(ed.), Kapitalismus als Religion (Berlin: Kulturverlag Kadmos, 2003), pp. 265ff., p. 278.
137. Matthew Rabin, “Psychology and Economics,” in J. Econ. Lit. 36 (1998), 11ff.; James 
Heyman et al., “Auction Fever,” Journal of Interactive Marketing 18 (2004), 4ff.; Dan 
Ariely, Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces that Shape our Decisions (New York: 
Harper, 2008); on other greedy social institutions, see Lewis A. Coser, Gierige Institutionen: 
Soziologische Studien über totales Engagement (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2015), pp. 11ff.
138. But see already Werner Gephart, “Von der ‘Unternehmensethik’ zur ‘Unternehmensästhetik’: 
Einige Konsequenzen der kunstsoziologischen Fragestellung Max Webers,” Zeitschrift für 
Betriebswirtschaft. Ergänzungsheft 1 (1992), 51ff.
139. BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 of January 14, 2014, paragraph 98; now see also ECJ, decision of 
16 June 2015, C-62/14.
140. Urs Staeheli, “Political Epidemiology and the Financial Crisis,” in Poul Kjaer et al. (eds), The 
Financial Crisis in Constitutional Perspective: The Dark Side of Functional Differentiation 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011), pp. 113ff.
systems.134 One can gain a more adequate picture of the connections with the non-rational 
only if one instead traces the legal points of contact with arationality in the different 
social relations of co-evolution. Here legal aesthetics leads to the question of whether the 
legal instruments can be designed in such a way that they exhibit more refinement, more 
tact, and more sensitivity to the emotionally conditioned character of social structures. 
There is no shortage of occasions for posing this question of appropriateness. To sketch 
some examples:
(1) Business/Law: When it comes to the relationship between law and the economic 
sphere, the rational choice paradigm was superseded long ago by theories which 
treat the non-rational as part of economic rationality.135 Profit seeking,136 greed, and 
the psychologically conditioned character of trade are not the exclusive preserve of 
behavioral economics.137 Law is not very receptive to these arational 
phenomena.138 Financial market regulation is a prime example of the interconnec-
tion between the arational and the rational – an interconnection to which the Federal 
Constitutional Court (BVerfGE) also appealed in its decision on Outright Monetary 
Transactions (OMT) when it examined the argument of the European Central Bank 
that OMTs would combat irrational effects on the money market. The Federal 
Constitutional Court rejected this justification on the grounds that “the rational/
irrational distinction is meaningless in this context and in any case cannot be opera-
tionalized.”139 However, law will be able to address the epidemiological dynamics 
on the financial markets effectively140 only when it develops a more precise under-
standing of the interactions between arational and rational forces in economics.
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144. References in Lena Foljanty and Ulrike Lembke, “Die Konstruktion des Anderen in der 
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145. The classical account is Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. G. Schwab 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 34; for the current discussion, 
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Depenheuer (ed.), Recht und Tabu (Opladen: VS, 2003), pp. 141ff. (141): the state as an 
“erotic amorous project”; see also, in connection with the legal philosophy of Giorgio 
Agamben, Peg Birmingham, “Law’s Violent Judgement,” The New Centennial Review 
14 (2014), 99ff.
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(2) Religion/Law: Law is also confronted with the arational in the religious 
domain.141 The law often comes into contact with religiously connoted issues. 
This can be seen, for example, in how criminal law deals with so-called “honor 
killings.” In the discussion over whether “honor killing” satisfies the murder 
criterion referred to in §211 para. 2 of the German Criminal Code as “base 
motives,” a religious contextualization is often made in an attempt to distin-
guish “honor killings” from “separation killings out of separation anxiety,” in 
which the murder criterion is not considered to be satisfied.142 Court judgments 
that reject a sweeping demonization of honor killings143 are publicly criticized 
for granting a supposed “Islam allowance.”144 The ways of dealing with the 
arational in the law that originates in (supposedly) religious contexts must be 
subjected to critical examination.
(3) Politics/Law: There is nothing new about the claim that the arational is present in 
politics. On the contrary, this is the underlying thesis of political theology and its 
sovereigntist exaggeration of the political instinct as a seismograph for the politi-
cal – the friend-and-enemy distinction.145 Contemporary aestheticizations of the 
political also emphasize the connections between politics and the arational,146 
connect them with emotionality147 and stress their representation in music. 
Hymns and freedom songs are in this concept expressions of “soul forces.”148 
One of the central questions of legal aesthetics at this point is how human forces 
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Interests (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 22ff., for whom political 
institutions must be established so that passions can neutralize each other, which in turn 
presupposes that the interests, as moderate passions, can be opposed to the excessive and 
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150. On fear in politics, see Franz L. Neumann, “Angst in der Politik,” in Neumann, Wirtschaft, 
Staat, Demokratie (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1978), pp. 424ff.
151. Gunther Teubner, “Whistleblowing gegen den Herdentrieb?,” in Dirk Becker et al. (eds), 
Ökonomie der Werte (Marburg: Metropolis, 2013), pp. 39ff., p. 39.
152. Frieder Vogelmann, “Kraft, Widerständigkeit, Historizität,” Deutsche Zeitschrift für 
Philosophie 62 (2014), 1062ff., 1069.
153. ECtHR, Heinisch v. Germany, judgment of July 21, 2011, application no. 28274/08, 
para.64ff.
154. Luhmann, “Das Paradox der Menschenrechte und drei Formen seiner Entfaltung,” in 
Luhmann, Soziologische Aufklärung, pp. 229ff.; see also Judith Butler, Frames of War: 
When is Life Grievable? (Brooklyn, NY: Verso, 2009), pp. 38ff.
155. ECtHR, judgment of February 7, 2012, application no. 39954/08 (Axel Springer AG v. 
Germany), para. 83.
can be organized in order to render the idea of democracy socially effective.149 
Ultimately it is a matter of activating self-healing forces against collective anxi-
eties,150 forces that encourage “dissent, protest, opposition, and civic courage 
against the paralyzing atmosphere of … hierarchies and against pressures to con-
form.”151 The practice of whistleblowing is a prime example of the difficulties 
that law faces when it comes to dealing with people as “truth animals.”152 Here 
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in particular oper-
ates with categories of the arational that are in need of critical examination. Thus 
the ECtHR denies legal protection to whistleblowing motivated by revenge or the 
craving for personal recognition, for example, but seeks to protect whistleblow-
ing motivated by instincts of truth and justice, but without offering a more 
detailed explanation of these very different emanations of arational forces.153
(4) Media/Law: As a general rule, the processes in which public opinion is formed and 
expressed are charged with emotion. In this sense, Luhmann draws on Durkheim’s 
concept of colère publique to describe scandalization processes and manifesta-
tions of collective exuberance in the field of human rights.154 The example of 
freedom of the press demonstrates the difficulties faced by law in dealing with 
arationality in the media. The decisions of the ECtHR, for example, generally 
conclude that freedom of the press should outweigh the protection of private life 
and the protection of one’s “good name” in reporting when there is a public inter-
est in the content of the report.155 Protection of the freedom of the press does not 
apply, according to the court, when reporting only serves to satisfy public 
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Vierteljahreszeitschrift (2000), 388ff., 395ff.
162. See the reconstruction of the judgment in Caroline von Gall, “Vorerst gescheitert: ‘Pussy Riot’ 
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on the emotionality of criminal violence, see the treatment of the underlying issues in Randall 
Collins, “Entering and leaving the tunnel of violence,” Current Sociology 6 (2012), 132ff. (139).
curiosity156 – a distinction that the ECtHR has difficulty in upholding. This 
becomes apparent, for example, in its decision that a prince’s treatment of his 
illegitimate son was a matter of public interest, on the grounds that character traits 
of the prince could be inferred from this treatment, which in turn were also impor-
tant for his performance of his public office.157 Here the formation of a sensibility 
for arational processes in the public arena should help to develop appropriate solu-
tions for such cases that can contribute to stability at the dogmatic level.
(5) Family/Law: In the sphere of the family, it is obvious that the willingness to make 
sacrifices for the family, love, and also – especially in the case of failure, though 
not only (odi et amo) – countervailing passions like hatred158 constitute a forma-
tive component.159 Here, too, the law all too often exhibits a deficient sensibility 
for the arational, as is also shown specifically and especially by the example of 
family guarantees. The legal foil for deciding cases involving such guarantees take 
its orientation as a general rule from asymmetries of knowledge and power.160 But 
the law does not accord sufficient weight to the fact that such guarantees are also 
a matter of protecting the family system, and its pattern of loyalty based on emo-
tional ties, from economic corruption.161
(6) Art/Law: When it comes to the relationship between law and art, law is not ade-
quately attuned to the arational dimensions of the sphere of art either. The so-called 
“Pussy Riot” trials are prime examples of the arbitrariness of the way law deals 
with forms of musical expression. While the Moscow lower court attested that the 
members of the band had acted out of “religious hatred against a social group,”162 
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the court of appeal relativized this accusation.163 An individual application against 
these Russian decisions is pending with the ECtHR.164 Here the decisive question 
will be whether the domain of artistic freedom granted protection in Art. 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) also extends to aesthetic criticism 
by punk music, specifically when this music lends social protest an “emotional 
timber.”165
IV. Conclusion
All of the fields mentioned clearly exhibit an entanglement of rationality and arationality. 
If one wants to promote the subtlety of the associated legal emotional and perceptual 
culture,166 then one must first chart the relationship between law and the arational. 
Building on this, it then becomes a matter, normatively speaking, of sharpening the legal 
sense of appropriateness167 also with regard to the arational.168
Thus this movement involves two steps. The first (descriptive) step is to gain an 
understanding of how the arational becomes inscribed in the social domains of rational-
ity, in this case the law,169 in order to bring law closer to human beings and society. When 
“human freedom” is described as a central concern of “aesthetics,”170 this points to the 
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potential of a sociological aesthetics for law, namely for assessing the legal presupposi-
tions for shaping this freedom.171 This question is not answered by reconstructing a sup-
posed human nature. Rather, it is a matter of legal reflection on the tension that pervades 
human life in the guise of the difference between human being and social subject.172 In 
this sense, an aesthetics of law can link up with aesthetic theories that conceptualize the 
aesthetic question in terms of the “idea of aesthetic autonomy.”173 The challenge for legal 
theory is to look for ways to realize this very human freedom, which is not identical with 
the freedom of the subject.174
Then, the second (normative) step is to use reflection on the aesthetic constitution 
of the law to make legal practice itself more complex, that is, more adequate to human 
beings and society.175 In particular, the aesthetics of law makes possible a new 
approach to the justification of law. Whereas discourse-theoretical approaches situate 
the outcome of normativity in rational intersubjectivity, approaches in legal ethics 
generally externalize the normativity of law in morality, legal positivist interpreta-
tions treat the “basic norm” as the end point of reflection, political theories of law 
externalize the basis of validity in politics, and economic analyses of law elevate 
economic utility into the supreme measure of law,176 the aesthetics of law proposed 
here adopts a different approach. The basic normative reference of the law is not tied 
to a fixed point in the environment of law. Therefore, the law does not rest on a stable 
ground. Neither human nature, nor the consensus of subjects, nor the functional 
requirements of a social subsystem such as the economy, politics, or science consti-
tuted the outcome of normativity. The specific character of normativity resides instead 
in the relationship between autonomous law as a differentiated social sphere, on the 
one hand, and the rest of society and human beings, on the other. Aesthetic reflection 
on law enables us not only to thematize the relation between the domain of legal 
autonomy and its other, non-law, from within law, but also to develop legal safeguards 
for the social and human spaces of freedom.
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In all of this, an interdisciplinary analysis that aspires to throw light on the potential of an 
aesthetic perspective for the law itself must do justice to the normativity proper to law: aes-
thetic standards cannot be developed for law from the “outside” as it were.177 A non-violent 
force of law can arise only in a self-reflective manner,178 specifically by law becoming more 
responsive to human and social forces.179 Only when the law does justice to the rational and 
the arational alike will a different law “beyond legal violence” become possible.180
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